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René van der Veer (University of Leiden, The Netherlands)
The work of Lev Semnovich Vigotsky can be divided into four
periods. In the first period, which starts in about 1915 and
ends in 1924, he wrote the book 'The Psychology of Art' (Vy-
gotsky, 1971). The second phase in his work was initiated in
1924 and ended in 1927. In this period, Vygotsky tried to de-
velop an objective psychology. He also analysed thoroughly
several psychological currents and schools, which culminated
in his famous study 'The Meaning of (the significance of) the
Crisis in Psychology' (Vygotsky, 1927. In: Vygotsky, 1982a).
In the third period, which can be placed in the period from
about 1927 until 1930-31, Vygotsky developed his famous cul-
tural-historical theory of the development of the higher psy-
chological functions. In 1930-31, he switched the focus of
his research to the problems of speech and thought, and the
development of these processes in child-development. This re-
search resulted in his 'unfinished', well-known book 'Thought
and language'. It is only this last book that has been stud-
ied by researchers in the Anglo-Saxon countries (using Kauf-
manns rather mutilating translation, 1962). It is not sur-
prising, then, that this last, fourth, period in the work of
Vygotsky has been considered by Western researchers (and by
Soviet researchers) as the most important, also because in
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this book one can detect some interesting changes in Vygot-
sky's line of thought. Vygotsky switched his attention, for
instance, from the cognitive factors in children's speech and
thought to the emotional, motivational factors and began con-
centrating his research on the 'meaning' (Znacenie) of words
rather than on signs as such.
The third period of his work is also considered as being
of the utmost importance, because at that time Vygotsky cre-
ated his cultural-historical approach, which has had such an
enormous influence on psychological research in the Soviet-
Union and in the Western world until today. Although much can
be said in favour of such an evaluation of Vygotsky's work,
it is now becoming more clear that to get a complete picture
of the originality of Vygotsky1s ideas and of his intellect-
ual 'debts', we should not underestimate the importance of
these first two periods of his research. In particular his
philosophical and methodological ideas developed and matured
in this phase (see also Jarosevskij and Gurgenidze in Vygot-
sky, 1982a) . We would also like to suggest that it is Vygot-
sky's philosophical and methodological approach, rather than
his empirical investigations, that will continue to be of in-
terest for psychological and educational researchers. These
are some of the reasons why we will concentrate in this paper
on the early periods in Vygotsky's work, and in particular on
the way in which his philosophical and methodological ideas
developed.
Several authors, e.g. Hydén, 1978, 1980; Mecacci, 1976;
Jarosevskij and Gurgenidze, 1977, 1981 and 1982 (in: Vygot-
sky, 1982a), and Leontiev (in: Vygotsky, 1982a) place the
first phase of Vygotsky's research in the period from 1915
until January 1924, this being the time at which Vygotsky
started to work at the institute of Kornilov (see also Vos,
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1976). This is considered as the start of his career as a
psychologist in the narrow sense of the word. We do not Know
very much about this period but we do know (see Leontiev, in
Vygotsky, 19S2a; Vos, 1976) that he studied law and philol-
ogy. Meanwhile, he occupied himself with the study of thea-
trical art and wrote numerous reviews of theatrical perform-
ances. At the same time, he taught history to a group of high
school pupils and held seminars on political economy. It is
rather surprising that he still found the time to study some
of the works of world literature. The works of, among others,
Tolstoj, Dostoevskij and Shakespeare were thoroughly analys-
ed. He was mainly interested in trying to detect the underly-
ing psychological laws, which would explain the aesthetical
experience a reader has, when enjoying a work of art. This
research resulted, as is well-known, in his 'The Psychology
of Art' (1925). In the period up to 1924, Vygotsky also ac-
quainted himself with the German classical philosophy and
marxist authors. We are told (Leontiev in: Vygotsky, 1982)
that he read, for instance, Marx, Engels, and Schopenhauer).
It is also possible that Vygotsky knew Politzer, the French
precursor of the marxist philosopher sève (see Hydén, 1978).
Finally, Vygotsky got to know in this period the work of B.
de Spinoza and A.A. Potebnja. In this paper we would like to
say a few words about the influence of Spinoza. But first of
all we would like to state that it is not our intention to
detract from Vygotsky's reputation by pointing out some simi-
larities with other researchers. For Vygotsky, if we may per-
mit ourselves a slight exaggeration, took the idea of intern-
alization from Hegel and Janet the principle of genetic ana-
lysis from Marx and Blonskij, he found the idea of a unitary
approach in the works of the Gestalt psychologists, the con-
ception of the sign as a means or tool can be traced to Po-
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tebnja, the category of 'communication' (obscenie) was al-
ready stated by Hegel, and the idea of the intellectualiza-
tion of psychological functions can be found in the works of
Spinoza. This is not a complete list of Vygotsky's 'intel-
lectual debts' but, of course, the force of Vygotsky's work
lies exactly in the way he connected all these separate no-
tions into an integrative system, his cultural-historical
approach to the development of the higher psychological pro-
cesses.
Two works of Spinoza had been translated into Russian at
that time. They are his 'Ethics' (1911, Moscow) and the small
work 'Treatise on the Purification of the Intellect' (1914,
Moscow).
We have found three thoughts in the work of Spinoza which
have inspired Vygotsky. The first idea is intellectualism,
the second monism or determinism and the third is the use of
intellectual tools. We would like to state that both authors
show a certain degree of intellectualism (or cognitivism).
That is, both authors share the ideal of a personality in
which the intellectual functions (thinking) control to a
large degree the whole personality. Spinoza in his 'Ethics'
opposes especially the view of man as a slave to his affects,
his passions. Spinoza sought a way for man to control his
passions and found it in the capacity of the mind to under-
stand. If the intellect has clear and distinct knowledge of
the emotions, it will gradually learn to control them. The
initially rather vague, primitive emotions will eventually
(in the ideal case) be understood by the intellect and in
that way they can be controlled. In the narrow sense of the
word, says Spinoza, we only act, in so far as we understand
what we are doing. It is this growing control of the emotions
by the intellect and the resulting control of our behaviour
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that can also be found in the work of Vygotsky. Of course,
Vygotsky gave a more psychological elaboration of this notion
and he did not limit the principle to the emotions, but ex-
tended it to all other, initially primitive psychological
processes. The infant, for instance, has initially only a
primitive, natural memory, more or less dependent on chance
impressions, but in ontogenesis thought and, above all,
speech develop and the memory gradually becomes better struc-
tured and controllable. This is the so-called development of
natural memory into logical, instrumental memory as studied
by Leontiev. We can see this principle very clear in Vygot-
sky' s 'Lectures on Psychology' (1932, in : Vygotsky, 1982b).
In these lectures, Vygotsky regularly underlines the over-
whelming influence of speech and thought on the psychological
processes and calls attention to a tendency in child develop-
ment of ' intellectualization of all psychological functions'
(Vygotsky, 1982b, p. 415). In another lecture, he states
"The course of the development of the imagination
of the child, as well as the course of the develop-
ment of other higher psychological functions is in
an essential way connected to the speech of the
child".
(1982b, p. 448)
We can also find this idea in his lecture on the origin of
human voluntary behaviour (1982b, p. 464). Besides this,
Vygotsky wrote (1982a, p. 125) in a paper in 1930 on psychol-
ogical systems:
"We said that, as Spinoza correctly stated, the
knowledge of an emotion changes this emotion and
changes it from a passive into an active state.
That I think about things outside of myself, does
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not change anything in them, but that I think about
emotions, that I place them in other relations to
my intellect and other instances, will change much
in my psychological life. To say it more simply,
our emotions act in a complex system with our con-
cepts .. . " .
We can conclude that both Spinoza and Vygotsky have a view of
man's development as a process of growing control of the psy-
chological processes by the intellect. Of course, there are
also differences between their views of the process of intel-
lectualization. Spinoza considers, for example, the under-
standing of the emotions a sufficient condition for the (in
any case partial) control of them. Vygotsky, however, under-
lines much more the role of speech in the development of the
higher, "cultural", emotions. It is speech, which gives the
developing child the opportunity to control the initially
spontaneously evolving emotions and it is the use of the con-
cepts of language that will enable the child eventually to
develop his initially primitive emotions into refined aesthe-
tic judgements.
With regard to Spinoza's so-called monism or determinism,
we would like to point out the following. Spinoza writes in
the preface of the third book of his 'Ethics1:
"The majority of those, who have written about the
emotions and behaviour of man, talk about these
subjects, as if they were not natural things, sub-
ject to general natural laws, as if they were
things, not belonging to nature. Sometimes it seems
as though they imagine man i nature as an indepen-
dent state within another state ... for they pre-
sume that he has complete power over his acts and
that these are determined by nothing other than man
himself" .
(Spinoza, 1974, p. 135-136).
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In the following, Spinoza makes it very clear that he thinks
that all emotions have a natural cause and can be explained
by natural laws. This is a clearly monistic point of view
with regard to the psychophysical problem. This is also one
of the main reasons why Spinoza has been a rather popular
philosopher in marxist circles. Vygotsky too, who during his
whole career as a psychologist manoeuvred between the Scylla
of the denial of any differences between the lower and the
higher psychological processes and the Charybdis of stating
an irreducible, essential distinction between both types of
psychological process, found a clear support in this book. On
the one hand, he objected to the reduction of higher psychol-
ogical processes to lower ones. For this would also be in
clear contradiction with the tenets of dialectical material-
ism, which state that many small quantative changes in a
thing or process will eventually lead to a qualitative break-
through, to a process or thing of a qualitatively different
nature. On the other hand, the lower and higher psychological
processes could not be considered as separate, irreducible
domains, as this would be in contradiction to the principle
of historism or genetical, developmental analysis. As we saw
in this theory, the higher psychological processes develop
out of the lower ones and to neglect this fact would be to
make a 'naturalistic' error. 'Naturalism' considers phenomena
that developed historically as if it were natural phenomena.
It is thus quite understandable that Vygotsky in his instable
balance between reductionism and naturalism found a source of
inspiration in Spinoza's 'Ethics'. "For dialectical psychol-
ogy"' he wrote in 1930, "the mind (psichika) is not, to use
an expression of Spinoza, something beyond nature or a state
in the state, it is part of nature itself, directly connected
to the functions or the higher organized matter of our brain.
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Like all other nature it was not created, but evolved in a
developmental process" (Vygotsky, 1930, in: Vygotsky, 1982a,
p. 137).
Finally, we would like to make a few remarks about the
notion of intellectual tools, which can be found in the work
of both authors. As is wellknown, Vygotsky frequently compar-
ed the tool to the sign (language). Just as in manual labour
where the bare hand is relatively powerless in comparison to
the hand provided with a tool, the 'bare natural mind' cannot
compete with the intellect which makes use of speech or lan-
guage. Of course, this metaphor can be found in the works of
such marxist authors as Engels (in his Dialectics of Nature)
and Plechanov. The comparison can also be found in the work
of A.A. Potebnja (1922).
Spinoza writes the following:
"Now that we know which sort of knowledge we need,
we must indicate the way and the method by which we
wish to find out the things we want to know, indeed
learn to know. In the first place, it can be said
that there is no investigation ad infinitum here. I
mean: in order to find the best method for tracing
the truth we do not need a second method, which
would check that method for find the truth, and for
that second one not a third and so on ad infinitum.
In this way, we would never attain the knowledge of
truth, or any knowledge whatever. It is the same
here as with material tools, about which one could
reason in the same way. For to weld iron one needs
a hammer and to have a hammer it has to be made
first; for which we need another hammer and other
tools, which have in their way to be produced by
other tools, and so on ad infinitum. And with these
arguments one could try - although in vain - to
prove that man is quite unable ever to weld iron.
But: at first people were able, using the native
equipment, to make, though laboriously and imper-
fect, some very simple tools. With the help of
these they could, more easily and with greater per-
fection, produce more complex tools and thus, grad-
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ually ascending from the most simple trick to more
complex apparatuses and workings, they succeeded
finally in raaking with the least possible effort
many and very complex tools. In a similar way, now,
the intellect creates by its innate power its own
tools, with which it creates new powers for new
mental performances, which in their turn create
again new tools and the capacity to extend the in-
vestigation even further. And so it progresses step
by step, until the summit of wisdom has been reach-
ed"
(Spinoza, 1974, p. 11-12)
What is striking about this quotation is, first, Spinoza's
emphasis on the use of intellectual tools and, second, his
mention of the intellect as a developing intellect. With re-
gard to the intellectual tool, we may notice a striking
parallel with Vygotsky's emphasis on the sign as an intel-
lectual means or tool. Using the tool (the sign), the intel-
lect creates new possibilities (compare e.g. Bruner's concep-
tion of tools) and every phase in child development is, ac-
cording to Vygotsky, almost completely determined by the
level of the child's speech at that moment. "... everything
depends on the degree of development of the meaning of the
child's words" he wrote in 1932 (Vygotsky, 1982b, p. 415) and
"all basic systems of psychological functions depend on the
level the child reached in the development of word meaning".
So we see a clear parallel here between Spinoza's emphasis on
the use of intellectual tools for the controlling of one's
own emotional behaviour and Vygotsky's emphasis on the use of
signs as an intellectual tool for the control of one's behav-
iour. According to Vygotsky, the child at first literally
steers itself by the use of signs. Also quite interesting is
Spinoza's view on the development of intellectual tools. Man
is continually reaching higher levels of thinking through his
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creation of ever better intellectual tools "until the summit
of wisdom hs been reached". In Vygotsky's work, of course, we
find that this view is very pronounced. In fact, the princi-
ple of genetic analysis can be considered as the underlying
principle of all his work. In almost all of his works Vygot-
sky underlined that the child is continually developing and
that he or she can only be understood with respect to this
development. As Blonskij said, we have to analyse the history
of behaviour to really understand it. Thus, it is not only in
the work of marxist authors that Vygotsky found the principal
of genetic analysis. His favourite philosopher expressed the
same point of view.
In the above we have demonstrated some parallels between
Vygotsky's cultural-historical theory of the higher psychol-
ogical functions and Spinoza's theory. We do not wish to sug-
gest that Vygotsky took these ideas from Spinoza, in fact all
of them have been stated by several other authors. We do
think that we have explained part of Vygotsky's fascination.
Spinoza was a fascinating philosopher who wrote about sub™
jects we would now consider as belonging to the domain of
psychology and he stated some principles which were clearly
shared by Vygotsky, It was Lev Semenovich Vygkosky who devel-
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